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Abstract 
This paper investigates a price-setting mixed model involving a private firm and a public firm to reassess the welfare 
effect of partial privatization. First, the government chooses the level of privatization to maximize social welfare. 
Second, observing the level of privatization, the firms non-cooperatively choose prices. The paper then demonstrates 
that partial privatization is not an optimal choice for the government.
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1. Introduction 
    In recent years, the theoretical analysis of partial privatization of state-owned public firms has 
been  deeply  and  extensively  studied  by  many  economists.  For  example,  Matsumura  (1998) 
investigates a quantity-setting duopoly model involving a profit-maximizing private firm and a 
state-owned public firm. First, the government wishes to maximize social welfare and chooses the 
degree of privatization of the state-owned public firm. Second, the private firm and the partially 
privatized firm non-cooperatively choose quantities. He then shows that neither full privatization 
(the government does not hold any shares) nor full nationalization (the government holds all of the 
shares) is optimal for social welfare; that is, partial privatization is optimal. There are also many 
other excellent studies such as Chang (2005), Matsumura and Kanda (2005), Chao and Yu (2006), 
Tomaru (2006), Fujiwara (2007), Lu and Poddar (2007), Han and Ogawa (2008), Ishibashi and 
Kaneko (2008), and Roy chowdhury (2009). Most theoretical studies demonstrate that the optimal 
degree  of  privatization  exhibits  neither  full  privatization  nor  full  nationalization  but  partial 
privatization. 
    This paper investigates a price-setting mixed model involving a private firm and a public firm to 
reassess the welfare effect of partial privatization. The timing of the game runs as follows. In the 
first stage, the government chooses the level of privatization to maximize social welfare. Observing 
the level of privatization, the firms non-cooperatively choose prices in the second stage. 
    The purpose of the paper is to assess the welfare effect of partial privatization by examining a 
price-setting mixed duopoly model and to show that partial privatization is not optimal in the 
price-setting mixed competition. This result is in marked contrast to that of the quantity-setting 
mixed competition. 
    The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate the model. 
Section 3 assesses the welfare effect of partial privatization in price-setting mixed duopoly. Finally, 
Section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. The model 
    In this section, we consider a price-setting mixed model with two firms (firm 0 and firm 1) and 
the government. These firms produce imperfectly substitutable goods. There is no possibility of 
entry or exit. On the consumption side, there is a continuum of consumers of the same type whose 
utility function is linear. Subscripts 0 and 1 denote firm 0 and firm 1, respectively. Following 
Bárcena-Ruiz  (2007),  we  assume  that  the  representative  consumer  maximizes 
0 1 0 0 1 1 ( , ) U q q p q p q - - , where  i q   is the amount of good  i  and  i p   is its price  ( 0,1) i = . The 
function  0 1 ( , ) U q q   is quadratic, strictly concave and symmetric in  0 q   and  1 q :   3
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where  a is  a  constant  and  (0,1) bÎ   is  a  measure  of  the  degree  of  substitutability  among 
products. The demand function is given by 












        ( , 0,1;  ) i j i j = ¹ .                                               (2) 
For simplicity, we assume that  1 a =   and  0.5 b = . Each firm’s profit is 
        ( ) i i i i p c q p = -          ( 0,1) i = ,                                                                        (3) 
where  i c   is the marginal cost of firm  i. Since the result of this paper is not affected by  i c , we 
normalize it to zero. Firm 1 aims to maximize its profit. Furthermore, social welfare, which is the 
sum of consumer surplus and profits, is given by 
        0 1 W CS p p = + + .                                                                                          (4) 
The objective function of firm 0 is given by 
        0 (1 ) V W lp l = + - ,                                                                                    (5) 
where  [0,1] lÎ   is the level of privatization. That is, if  0 l =   firm 0 becomes purely private, 
whereas if  1 l =   it becomes purely public. 
    The game is constructed by the following two-stage decision-making. In the first stage, the 
government chooses the level of privatization,  l , to maximize social welfare. Observing  l , the 
firms non-cooperatively choose prices in the second stage. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium 
of the price-setting mixed game is examined. 
 
 
3. The main result 
    In this section, we examine the welfare effect of partial privatization in the price-setting mixed 
game. We obtain the reaction functions in prices of the two firms: 
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    From (6) and (7), the equilibrium can be derived as follows: 






































    Furthermore, the profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare can be expressed as follows:   4
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The  maximization  of  (11)  with  respect  to  l   is  derived  from  / dW dl .  That  is,  we  have 
25/22 1.136 l = » .  W   is illustrated in Figure 1 as a function of  l . When  0 1 l £ £ ,  W  is 
a strictly increasing function of  l . This can be stated in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1. In the price-setting mixed model, partial privatization is not a reasonable choice for 
the government that wishes to maximize social welfare. 
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4. Conclusion 
    We have investigated a price-setting mixed model involving a private firm and a public firm to 
reassess the welfare effect of partial privatization and have shown that partial privatization is not 
optimal in the price-setting mixed competition. We have found that our result is in marked contrast 
to that of the quantity-setting mixed competition. 
    We have used a mixed model with a public firm and a domestic private firm and have examined 
the welfare effect of partial privatization. However, what if public  and  foreign private firms 
compete against each other? This is one of various extensions of this study that remain to be 
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